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Abstract This study provides a ﬁrst test of an experimental method, the ‘‘space odyssey’’
paradigm, that was designed to manipulate interpretation bias in children. Seventy non-
clinical children aged 8–12 years ﬁrst completed a standardized anxiety questionnaire.
Following this, they completed the space odyssey paradigm to induce either a negative or a
positive interpretation bias. After this stage of interpretation training, children were pre-
sented with a series of ambiguous vignettes for which they had to rate perceived levels of
threat as an index of interpretation bias. Results indicated that the space odyssey paradigm
was successful in training interpretations: children in the negative training condition
quickly learned to choose negative outcomes, while children in the positive training
condition rapidly learned to select positive outcomes. Most importantly, children’s sub-
sequent threat perception scores for the ambiguous vignettes were affected by the
manipulation. That is, children in the negative training condition perceived more threat
than children in the positive training condition. Interestingly, the effects of training were
most pronounced in high anxious children. Directions for future research with this para-
digm are brieﬂy discussed.
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Introduction
According to Kendall’s [1] cognitive theory, pathological manifestations of childhood
anxiety result from the chronic overactivity of schemas organized around themes of vul-
nerability and danger. These overactive schemas are assumed to focus processing resources
chronically on threat-relevant information and manifest themselves in so-called cognitive
distortions. These distortions pertain to biased cognitive processes that yield erroneous and
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nitive distortion is interpretation bias, which refers to the tendency to attach a threatening
meaning to ambiguous stimuli. Interpretation bias might explain why anxious children so
readily evaluate fairly benign situations as dangerous.
Various studies have demonstrated that interpretation bias is present in anxious youths.
For example, Bell-Dolan [4] presented 9- to 11-year-old children who were high or low on
trait anxiety, with a series of videotaped peer-interaction scenarios displaying peer
behaviour that was either hostile, non-hostile, or ambiguous. Results showed that the high-
anxious children were equally accurate in identifying hostile intent in peer interactions as
their low-anxious counterparts. However, high-anxious children more frequently inter-
preted the non-hostile and ambiguous scenarios as threatening. In another study of Barrett
et al. [5], anxiety disordered children, children with oppositional deﬁant disorder, and
normal controls (all aged between 7 and 14 years) were presented with vignettes of
ambiguous situations and asked about what was happening in each situation. Following
this, children were given two possible neutral outcomes and two possible threatening
outcomes and were asked to indicate which outcome was most likely to occur. Results
showed that both anxious and oppositional children more frequently perceived ambiguous
situations as threatening than did normal controls, with anxious children more often
choosing avoidant outcomes and oppositional children more frequently choosing aggres-
sive outcomes [see also 6, 7]. In addition, a series of studies conducted by Muris and
colleagues [8–10] has shown that anxious children only need very minor threat cues before
interpreting ambiguous vignettes as threatening. Adopting a different experimental
method, Hadwin et al. [11] confronted 7- to 9-year-old children with homophones (i.e.,
words that sound the same but have different meanings) that either had a neutral or a
threatening meaning (e.g., dye versus die). The results showed that children’s anxiety
levels were positively associated with the tendency to interpret the homophones as
threatening. A comparable approach was followed by Taghavi et al. [12] who presented 9-
to 16-year-old youths with homographs (i.e., words that are spelled the same but have
different meanings; e.g., tear) that were printed on cards. Participants were asked to
construct a sentence that included the homograph. The results of this study indicated that
anxious children and adolescents produced signiﬁcantly more sentences that were con-
sistent with a threatening homograph interpretation than did the control children. All these
studies provide a demonstration of anxious children’s inclination to perceive the external
world as dangerous and illustrate how easily these youths become entangled in anxious
feelings and thought processes.
Few investigations have examined the origins of interpretation bias in child populations.
While it is generally assumed that inherited temperament or personality characteristics
such as neuroticism for a large part determine this type of cognitive distortion [2, 3], there
is some recent evidence indicating that environmental inﬂuences are also involved. For
example, Creswell et al. [13] employed an ambiguous scenario task to measure interpre-
tation bias in a mixed sample of clinically anxious and non-clinical children (aged
7–15 years) and their mothers. The results showed that children’s and mothers’ interpre-
tation bias scores were positively correlated, suggesting that ‘‘children’s information pro-
cessing style may result from internalisation of parental perception of threat’’ [13, p. 1379;
see also 14]. In a subsequent longitudinal study, Creswell et al. [15] examined whether
mothers’ anxious cognitions were predictive of children’s interpretation bias over time
(i.e., a period of 6 months). Results indeed revealed the hypothesised prospective link,
which provides further support for the idea that family inﬂuences are involved in the
formation of interpretation bias [16].
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parents (i.e. mothers) to their children, it remains unclear what mechanism is responsible
for the transfer of this cognitive bias. One possibility is that biased interpretation is
installed by anxious parents who, due to their own interpretation bias, frequently provide
negative feedback about ambiguous stimuli and situations to their children. In line with this
idea, recent evidence from the adult literature has shown that a threat-related interpretation
bias can be induced by training participants to generate negative outcomes for ambiguous
stimuli. For example, Mathews and Mackintosh [17] confronted their participants with
brief ambiguous vignettes, and instructed them to attach either a positive or a negative
interpretation to these vignettes by completing one of two word fragments. Participants
received feedback (i.e., a correct or a wrong answer message) about their responses in such
way that one group was learned to disambiguate the vignettes in a threatening way,
whereas the other group was taught to resolve the vignettes in a benign way. Results
demonstrated that the training was successful: participants in the negative training group
responded signiﬁcantly faster to negatively toned fragments, while participants in the
positive training group responded more quickly to positively toned fragments. Most
importantly, a subsequent testing stage during which participants had to interpret a new set
of ambiguous vignettes, revealed that their interpretation style was indeed changed. That
is, participants in the negative training group more frequently chose negative interpreta-
tions, whereas participants in the positive training group more often endorsed positive
interpretations. These and other ﬁndings suggest that interpretation bias can be successfully
manipulated by learning experiences [18–23].
Thus far, all studies on the experimental training of interpretation bias have been
conducted with adults. Meanwhile this research might provide valuable insight in the
origins of this type of cognitive distortion (see supra) and allied anxiety symptoms in
children. Of course the challenge is to develop an experimental paradigm that is suitable
for manipulating interpretation bias in young people, which is acceptable from an ethical
point of view as well. With this in mind, we developed the ‘‘space odyssey’’ paradigm,
which essentially is a computer game of an imaginary journey to an unknown planet.
During the ﬁrst part of the game, children get acquainted with the unknown living con-
ditions on the new planet: they are presented with brief scenarios describing unknown
situations. For each situation, children have to choose between a negative (i.e., mildly
threatening) or a positive outcome. Children continuously receive feedback on the cor-
rectness of their choices. In one half of the children the choice of negative outcomes is
reinforced (i.e., negative training group), whereas in the other half the choice of positive
outcomes is reinforced (i.e., positive training group). The second part of the game actually
is an interpretation bias task: children are asked to imagine that they still live on the new
planet and confronted with ambiguous scenarios describing everyday situations that could
also occur on earth (e.g., going to school, encountering unfamiliar people). The main task
of the children is to rate the level of threat associated with each of these situations. The
present article describes a ﬁrst attempt to manipulate interpretation bias in children using
this ‘‘space odyssey’’ paradigm. As this study provides a test of the suitability of this
training method, it was conducted in a sample of non-clinical children. However, to
explore whether the manipulation has differential impact on high- and low-anxious chil-
dren, we also measured levels of anxiety disorders symptoms. It was hypothesized that
children in the negative training group would display higher levels of threat perception
than children in the positive training group. In addition, it was expected that the negative
training would have more impact on relatively high-anxious children and thus results in a
stronger cognitive bias than in low-anxious children.
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Participants
The parents of 80 children from a regular primary school in Dordrecht, the Netherlands,
were approached by mail with the request to participate in the current study. Most parents
(87.5%) responded favourable to this invitation and completed and signed the informed
consent form. Six parents did not allow their child to participate, whereas four other
parents did not respond to our mailing at all. The 70 participating children (34 boys and 36
girls) had a mean age of 10.03 years (SD = 0.88; range 8–12 years). The research project
was ofﬁcially approved by the Ethical Committee of Psychological Research of Erasmus
University Rotterdam. Due to school constraints, no exact information about the socio-
economic background of the youths was available. However, 14.3% of the children was
non-Caucasian, which in the Netherlands is generally indicative for a lower socioeconomic
status.
Questionnaire
The Screen for Child Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders (SCARED) is a self-report
questionnaire for measuring anxiety disorder symptoms in children and adolescents [24,
25]. The scale consists of 41 items that can be allocated to ﬁve subscales. Four of the
subscales parallel anxiety disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders [26], namely panic/somatic (e.g., ‘‘When frightened, my heart beats
fast’’), generalized anxiety (e.g., ‘‘I am a worrier’’), separation anxiety (e.g., ‘‘I don’t like
being away from my family’’), and social phobia (e.g., ‘‘I don’t like to be with unfamiliar
people’’). The ﬁfth subscale is school phobia (e.g., ‘‘I am scared to go to school’’) which
represents a common anxiety problem in youths. Children are asked to rate the frequency
with which they experience each symptom using three-point scales (0 = almost never,
1 = sometimes, and 2 = often). SCARED total and subscale scores are obtained by
summing relevant items. Research has demonstrated that the SCARED has good internal
consistency, test–retest reliability, and validity, and this conclusion appears true for clinical
as well as non-clinical samples of youths [24, 25, 27].
The ‘‘Space Odyssey’’ Paradigm
This paradigm was speciﬁcally construed for the purpose of the present study. Essentially
this paradigm involves a computer task that is programmed in E-prime (Version 1.0) [28].
Prior to the real task, children were given the following general instruction, which was
presented to them on the computer screen: ‘‘It is the year 2010. You and your parents are
astronauts who travel through space. You are searching for a new planet where people can
live. After a long journey, you discover a big planet. You decide to land on the planet and
to explore it. When the spacecraft has landed, you discover that the planet resembles the
earth in many ways, but there are also a lot of things that you do not know’’. The computer
task consisted of two stages: (1) a training stage during which either a negative or a
positive interpretation bias was induced, and (2) a testing stage that was employed to
measure interpretation bias.
The training stage consisted of 30 trials. In every trial children were presented with a
short scenario describing an unknown situation that might happen on the unknown planet.
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describing a negative outcome. For example, the scenario ‘‘On the street, you encounter a
spaceman. He has a sort of toy handgun and he ﬁres at you…’’ was followed by (A) ‘‘You
are laughing: it is a water pistol and the weather is ﬁne anyway’’, and (B) ‘‘Oops, this hurts!
The pistol produces a red beam which burns your skin!’’ (for further examples, see
Appendix A). Children were instructed to read the scenario and the two possible outcomes
and then to choose one of the outcomes by pressing the A or B button on the keyboard of
the computer. Directly after pressing one of the buttons, the scenario and outcomes dis-
appeared from the screen to be replaced by either the word ‘‘Good’’ or ‘‘Wrong’’ thereby
proving the children with feedback on their choice. In the negative training condition, the
choice of a negative outcome was always followed by ‘‘Good!’’ and the choice of a
positive outcome was always followed by ‘‘Wrong!’’. In the positive training condition,
these outcome-feedback sequences were reversed. Thus, in the negative training condition
the choice of a negative outcome was reinforced, whereas in the positive training condition
the choice of a positive outcome was reinforced.
The testing stage consisted of ambiguous vignettes that have been employed in previous
research to measure interpretation bias in children [10, 29]. Nine vignettes were used, all
describing ambiguous situations that children may encounter in daily life (i.e., givingan oral
report in front of the class, going to the sporting club for the ﬁrst time, staying home alone in
the evening, not seeing one’s mother in a large shopping mall, staying with a friend while
parents are on vacation, meeting unknown people who have come to visit mother, having to
take an important test at school, encountering unfamiliar men in a big city, driving a bike
on a busy street; for an example see Appendix B). Each vignette was construed in such way
that children were still given the idea that they were confronted with these (everyday)
situations during their space journey. This was achieved by including the word ‘‘space’’
in the ﬁrst sentence of each vignette (e.g., ‘‘school’’ was described as ‘‘space-school’’,
‘‘city’’ as ‘‘space-city’’, ‘‘bike’’ as ‘‘space-bike’’). Children started this stage by reading the
following instruction on the computer screen: ‘‘In a moment, you are going to read a number
of brief stories. Some stories are scary: this means that these stories will have a bad ending.
Some stories are not scary: this means that these stories will have a good ending (note:i n
fact all vignettes were ambiguous). Stories will be presented to you sentence-by-sentence,
and after each sentence you have to make a prediction on how scary that story is going to
become by pressing a ﬁgure on the keyboard ranging between 1, which means not at all
scary and 7, which indicates very scary’’ (the pertinent buttons of the keyboard were
highlighted in order to facilitate children’s responses). As there were nine vignettes that
were each composed of 5 sentences, there were 45 responses. As a result, scores on this test
varied between 45 and 315, with higher scores reﬂecting higher levels of threat perception
(i.e., negative interpretation bias).
Procedure
After obtaining informed consent from the parents, children ﬁrst completed the SCARED
during a classroom session. The teacher and the research assistant were present during this
assessment in order to ensure conﬁdential responding and to provide assistance if neces-
sary. Within two weeks after completion of the questionnaire, children were tested
individually with the computer task by a trained female research assistant in a separate
room at school. Children were randomly allocated to either the negative training (n = 34,
15 boys and 19 girls, mean age = 10.12 years, SD = 0.81) or the positive training
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123condition (n = 36, 19 boys and 17 girls, mean age = 9.94, SD = 0.95). The assistant was
blind to children’s questionnaire scores. She ﬁrst brieﬂy introduced herself, comforted the
child, and then started the E-prime program on the computer (a MacBook). The assistant
remained present during the full procedure: she read the instructions together with the
child, but kept herself apart during the training and testing stage of the experiment.
Statistical Analysis
Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were employed to examine whether the experimental
training was successful and to evaluate differences in threat perception of the ambiguous
vignettes (i.e., negative interpretation bias) between children in the negative and positive
training groups. As it is known from the literature that anxiety is an important correlate of
this type of cognitive bias [2, 3], this variable was included as a covariate in the latter
analysis. Further, given the fairly wide age range of the children included in the present
study and the fact that girls generally possess a greater vulnerability to display anxiety and
related phenomena [30], age and gender were also entered as covariates.
Results
Reliability of Measures
Mean scores on the SCARED and the ambiguous vignettes test were 17.70 (SD = 9.82)
and 126.09 (SD = 50.56), respectively. The SCARED total score had an internal consis-
tency coefﬁcient (Cronbach’s alpha) of .88, which indicates that this anxiety scale was
highly reliable. Further, scores obtained with the vignette task (testing stage) were also
reliable in terms of internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alphas of .95 and .96 in negative
and positive training groups, respectively. Thus, the main instruments that were used in this
study proved to be highly reliable.
Effects During Training Stage: Did Children Learn the Rule?
In order to evaluate whether children actually learned to choose either the negative or the
positive outcomes in a consistent way during the training stage, children’s responses were
ﬁrst divided into 6 blocks of 5 trials each. Then children’s average percentages of correct
responses were subjected to a 2 (training: negative vs. positive) 9 6 (blocks) repeated
measure ANOVA. This analysis yielded a signiﬁcant main effect of blocks [F(5,
340) = 34.29, p\.001, partial g
2 = .34]. Post-hoc tests indicated that the percentage of
correct trials signiﬁcantly increased from block 1 to block 2 [t(69) = 7.58, p\.001], after
which no further between-block differences were observed. As can be seen in the top panel
of Fig. 1, in both the negative and positive training condition children quickly learned the
‘interpretation rule’ and then consistently tended to choose the congruent outcome. In
addition, the interaction effect of training and block also reached statistical signiﬁcance
[F(5, 340) = 3.01, p\.05, partial g
2 = .04]: children appeared to learn the interpretation
rule more quickly in the positive training condition than in the negative training condition.
A closer inspection of the ﬁrst two blocks (see the bottom panel of Fig. 1) indicated that
differences in correct responses between the negative and positive training group were only
signiﬁcant during the ﬁrst two trials of the experiment [both t(68)s C 3.48, ps\.001].
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group learned to choose the negative outcomes, whereas children in the positive training
group learned to select the positive outcomes.
Effects During Testing Stage: Was Interpretation Bias Successfully Manipulated?
To examine the effects of the training stage on children’s interpretation bias, an ANOVA
was carried out to compare the threat perception scores of children in both training con-
ditions, which included SCARED anxiety symptoms, gender, and age as covariates. Most
importantly, the crucial main effect of training was signiﬁcant [F(1, 65) = 13.43, p\.01,
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Fig. 1 Percentage of children’s correct responses during the full training stage (consisting of 6 blocks of 5
trials each; upper graph) and during the ﬁrst two blocks (consisting of 5 trials each; lower graph) in which
either a negative or a positive interpretation bias was trained
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2 = .17]: adjusted mean threat perception scores were signiﬁcantly higher in the
negative (M = 144.62, SE = 7.01) than in the positive training group (M = 108.58,
SE = 6.81). The effects of the covariates gender [F(1, 65) = 6.72, p\.05, partial
g
2 = .09] and SCARED anxiety symptoms
1 [F(1, 65) = 16.02, p\.001, partial g
2 = .20]
were also signiﬁcant.
To examine the effect of gender more precisely, a 2 (training) 9 2 (gender) ANOVA
with SCARED anxiety symptoms and age as covariates was carried out. The main effect of
gender remained signiﬁcant [F(1, 64) = 6.62, p\.05, partial g
2 = .09], but there was no
interaction effect of gender and training [F(1, 64) = .04]. Inspection of the adjusted mean
threat perception scores indicated that girls clearly displayed higher threat perception
scores than did boys, means being 139.19 (SE = 6.95) and 113.07 (SE = 7.18),
respectively.
To investigate the effect of anxiety in more detail, a gender-speciﬁc mean split pro-
cedure was used to divide the sample in high-anxious (n = 34, 18 boys and 16 girls, mean
age = 9.94, SD = 0.86) and low-anxious children (n = 36, 16 boys and 20 girls, mean
age = 10.11, SD = 0.89). A 2 (training) 9 2 (anxiety group) ANOVA with age and
gender as covariates performed on children’s threat perception scores revealed signiﬁcant
main effects of training [F(1, 64) = 16.62, p\.001, partial g
2 = .21] and anxiety group
[F(1, 64) = 9.32, p\.01, partial g
2 = .13]. Interestingly, the interaction of training and
anxiety group was also signiﬁcant [F(1, 64) = 4.11, p\.05, partial g
2 = .06]. Post-hoc
comparisons indicated that although the negative training generally seemed to have
enhanced children’s threat perception scores, this effect only reached statistical signiﬁ-
cance in the high-anxious group [t(32) = 4.34, p\.001] (see Fig. 2).
Discussion
Various studies with adult populations have demonstrated that interpretation biases can be
experimentally manipulated [17–23]. The present article describes a ﬁrst attempt to
manipulate interpretation bias in children, using a newly developed experimental proce-
dure, the space odyssey paradigm. Non-clinical children aged 8–12 years ﬁrst underwent a
training stage which had the purpose to induce either a negative or a positive interpretation
bias. To test whether the paradigm was successful in inducing the intended bias, children
were subsequently presented with a series of ambiguous vignettes for which threat per-
ceptions were assessed. Results showed that the training stage was successful: children in
the negative training condition quickly learned to choose negative outcomes for the
unknown scenes, whereas children in the positive training condition rapidly learned to
select positive outcomes. Most importantly, children’s subsequent threat perception scores
were affected by this manipulation. That is, children in the negative training condition
displayed higher threat perception scores than children in the positive training condition.
Moreover, an additional analysis indicated that this pattern of results was particularly
pronounced for children who already exhibited high levels of anxiety symptoms. The latter
ﬁnding is interesting because it suggests that more vulnerable (i.e., already more anxious)
children were especially affected by our experimental manipulation.
Altogether the results produced by our ‘‘space odyssey’’ paradigm are interesting in that
they show that it is possible to change interpretation bias in child populations.
1 The correlations between the SCARED and ambiguous vignette test scores were .40 (p\.001) in the total
group, .60 (p\.001) in the negative training group, and .21 (p = .22) in the positive training group.
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research. First of all, as the present study did not include a baseline assessment, we were
not able to study the change in interpretation bias as a result of the experimental manip-
ulation. A pre- to post-test design will be necessary to deﬁnitely demonstrate that a
negative training indeed enhances children’s threat perception scores. Further, such a
design may reveal whether a positive training is able to reduce this type of cognitive bias,
especially in high-anxious children. Second, we only investigated whether the experi-
mental procedure had an effect on children’s cognitive style. Thus, it remains to be seen
whether this experimental paradigm also produces an effect on children’s anxiety levels.
Although previous research has shown that this seems to be the case in adults [17], it
remains to be seen whether such effects can also be demonstrated in child populations.
Third, during the training stage, a 100% contingency was employed to manipulate the
cognitive bias. While this seemed to be a ‘‘safe’’ strategy for a ﬁrst study to investigate the
manipulation of interpretation bias in children, it is clear that future studies should
investigate the effects at varying contingencies. Fourth and ﬁnally, the possibility cannot
be ruled out that the current results are at least in part explained by experimental demand.
That is, children rapidly learned the interpretation rule during the training stage and then
continued to employ this rule during the rest of the experiment. New studies could tackle
this problem by employing more ‘covert’ methods for assessing interpretation bias (e.g., by
means of homographs, homophones).
This study also yielded a number of additional ﬁndings that deserve some brief com-
ment. To begin with, in keeping with previous research [2, 3], a clear link between
children’s anxiety symptoms and interpretation bias scores was observed. According to
cognitive theory [31], cognitive distortions underlie anxiety problems in youths, but in fact
few studies have actually addressed this issue. Future research with the ‘‘space odyssey’’
paradigm as well as studies examining the prospective relation between interpretation bias
and anxiety over longer time periods are needed to address this important topic [32].
Further, there was a signiﬁcant gender difference with respect to interpretation bias, with
girls displaying a stronger tendency towards this cognitive distortion than boys. Although
this issue has been somewhat neglected in previous research, this result ﬁts nicely with the
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123observation that girls seem to be more anxiety-prone than boys [33, 34]. Finally, the results
of the training stage seem to suggest that the positive training worked faster than the
negative training. That is, during the ﬁrst trials of the experiment, children in the positive
training condition provided more correct responses than children in the negative training
condition. This ﬁnding was probably due to the fact that in this sample of non-clinical
children there was an initial tendency to choose the positive outcomes for the unknown
scenarios. For children in the positive training condition this inclination was immediately
conﬁrmed. However, for children in the negative training condition this initial tendency
towards the positive ﬁrst had to be corrected.
As already pointed out, the present study suffered from various methodological limi-
tations that at the same time provide a useful guide for future studies. Of course, another
shortcoming pertains to the imaginary character of our ‘‘space odyssey’’ paradigm, which
was purely governed by ethical considerations. Nevertheless, the paradigm provides an
experimental method that can be used to learn more about the origins of interpretation bias
in children. An interesting venue for future studies would be to try to adapt the paradigm so
that it becomes suitable for changing this type of cognitive distortions in real life. Recent
studies with adults have demonstrated that the training of a benign interpretation bias was
effective in reducing trait anxiety [35] and social anxiety [36], and it would be interesting
to study whether similar positive results can be achieved in high-anxious youths.
Summary
Interpretation bias refers to a cognitive distortion that can be deﬁned as the tendency to
disproportionately perceive threat in ambiguous situations, and is thought to play a role in
the continuation of anxiety problems [2, 3]. Previous work in adults has shown that
interpretation bias can be experimentally induced [17–23], which opens up the possibility
to explore the origins of this type of cognitive distortion and to further examine its role in
the development of anxiety. The present article describes an experimental paradigm (i.e.,
the ‘‘space odyssey’’ paradigm) that is suitable for manipulating interpretation bias in child
populations. The data indicate that by means of the paradigm children’s subsequent threat
perception scores for the ambiguous vignettes can be successfully manipulated. Future
research should further investigate the applicability of the paradigm to change interpre-
tation bias and anxiety in youth.
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Appendix A
Further examples of the brief scenarios that were used to induce interpretation bias.
1. In the wood, you see fruit hanging in a big tree. The fruit looks like apples. You take
one of them and you have a bite…
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123A. Wow, this fruit tastes very well.
B. Yuck! This fruit tastes very nasty.
2. On the plaza you ﬁnd a beautiful silver ball. You pick it up because you want to play
with it….
A. The ball is nice and bounces very well. You take it with you to show it to a friend.
B. Ouch! That hurts. The ball gives a painful electric shock. You are crying and run
to your home.
3. In the garden you see funny, little green birds in a tree. You go inside to get some
bread that you can feed to them…
A. That is funny. The birds come really close and one of them even eats the bread
from your hand.
B. Oops, this was not a good idea. The birds are really wild and begin to peck you in
your arms and legs.
Appendix B
Example of a vignette that was employed to measure threat perception and interpretation
bias.
1. You have decided to join a space-sporting club.
2. You are for the ﬁrst time in the changing-room of the sporting club.
3. There you see a group of children waiting in a row.
4. You don’t know any of them.
5. They all look at you.
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